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Sean Higgins
An important dimension in assessing any anti-poverty pro-
gram is to know how it affects the living standards of different sub-
groups of the poor. "is paper examines the impact of Brazil’s con-
ditional cash transfer program on poverty in urban and rural areas, 
formally testing the hypothesis that the program has a rural bias 
because its eligibility cut-off and transfer size are not adjusted for 
spatial price differences. Grosh et al. (2008) argue that a program 
that does not adjust its eligibility cut-off for spatial price differ-
ences will be biased toward the rural poor because they face a lower 
cost of living. Fiszbein and Schady (2009) find that eligible families 
in urban areas are less likely to participate in Bolsa Família, which 
they attribute to self-exclusion due to the cost of living differential 
and the implicitly lower value of the transfer in cities. Although the 
authors suggest that Bolsa Família might have a rural bias, no study 
has rigorously compared its impact in urban and rural areas.*
Regional price differences are not negligible in Brazil: the 
Laspeyres price index based on the cost of food and housing, in-
dexed to 1.000 for metropolitan São Paulo, is 0.447 in the rural 
Northeast region.1 In other words, the cost of living in São Paulo 
is more than twice the cost of living in the rural Northeast. "e real 
value of Bolsa Família’s eligibility cut-off and the purchasing power 
of the transfer are therefore significantly higher in more rural states 
than in São Paulo.
"is paper first presents a counterfactual static incidence 
analysis to determine the impact of Bolsa Família in 2009, using 
* Helfand, Rocha, and Vinhais (2009) decompose rural income growth over the period 1998-
2005 into four different sources of income, and find that growth in “other income”, primarily due 
to an increase in conditional cash transfers, explains around 16 percent of the decline in rural 
poverty over the period. "eir study focuses exclusively on rural areas.
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micro-data from the 2009 Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de Do-
micílios (PNAD),* an annual household survey. Incomes are ad-
justed by a spatial price index to reflect price differences across re-
gions, and poverty is defined as the inability to buy a basket of basic 
needs in one’s region. "rough a series of formal hypothesis tests 
and regression analyses, this paper seeks to determine whether Bol-
sa Família has a “rural bias”—in other words, a tendency to have a 
higher impact in rural areas.† Finally, after identifying a statistically 
significant rural bias, the paper addresses policy implications.
"e paper is divided into seven sections. Section 2 begins 
with a brief overview of poverty trends in Brazil and a description 
of the Bolsa Família program. It then describes how poverty should 
be defined in the context of this study and presents a methodology 
to adjust for spatial price differentials. Section 3 describes the data 
set and its issues and limitations. Section 4 analyzes the impact of 
Bolsa Família on poverty at the state level and examines whether 
its impact has been higher in relatively more rural states. Section 
5 uses a probit model to assess the probability of escaping poverty 
due to Bolsa Família, and contrasts the likelihood of poor urban 
and poor rural households surpassing the poverty line. Section 6 
discusses policy implications, and Section 7 presents the main con-
clusions.
DEFINING POVERTY AND ADJUSTING FOR SPATIAL PRICE 
DIFFERENTIALS
"e number of Brazilians living below the poverty line 
reached its highest level in history in 2003.2‡ Although a grow-
ing poor population in absolute terms can be partially attributed 
to population growth, the percentage of Brazilians living in poverty 
had not declined in nearly a decade: the overall change in the pov-
* In English, this translates as National Household Sample Survey.
† "is definition of “rural bias” is consistent with Todaro and Smith (2011).
‡ Here, the poverty line refers to the regional poverty lines calculated by the Brazilian government’s 
Applied Economics Research Institute (IPEA) using the cost of basic needs method.
90 ,MKKMRW-QTEGXSJ&SPWE*EQMPuE
erty headcount index between 1995 and 2003 was close to zero.* 
Measures that are sensitive to the depth and severity of poverty, 
such as the poverty gap and squared poverty gap,† show a simi-
lar trend: almost no change between 1995 and 2003.‡ Since 2003, 
however, poverty in Brazil has declined significantly, whether one 
measures the absolute number of poor people (the poverty head-
count), the percentage of the population living below the poverty 
line (the poverty headcount index), the depth of poverty (the pov-
erty gap), or the severity of poverty (the squared poverty gap). For 
example, using IPEA’s regional poverty lines,§ the poverty head-
count fell from over 61 million poor people in 2003 to under 40 
million poor in 2009 and the headcount index from 35.8 percent 
to 21.4 percent during the same period.3 Figures 1 and 2 show the 
decline of various measures of poverty since 2003.
Although several factors contributed to the decline in pov-
* !e overall change in the poverty headcount index between 1995 and 2003 varies depending 
on the data source, but all data sources agree that there was not a significant change. Using a $4 
PPP per day poverty line, the Socio-Economic Database for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(SEDLAC) reports a decrease in the poverty headcount index of -0.2 percentage points, while 
the World Bank’s PovcalNet reports an increase of +0.5 percentage points. Using regional 
poverty lines, IPEA reports an increase in the headcount index of +0.7 percentage points for 
the same period.
† !roughout this paper, the poverty gap refers to the poverty gap index—also known as the 
poverty gap ratio—rather than the total poverty gap (and likewise for the squared poverty gap). 
!e poverty gap index is equivalent to the total poverty gap (which can be thought of as the 
minimum amount of resources needed to eradicate poverty through perfectly-targeted transfers 
[Ravallion, 1992]) divided by the country’s population and expressed as a percentage of the 
poverty line.
‡ Data sources agree that there was not a significant change in the poverty gap or squared poverty 
gap between 1995 and 2003. SEDLAC reports a change in the poverty gap index (squared 
poverty gap index) of 0.0 (+0.1) percentage points, while the World Bank’s PovcalNet reports a 
change of +0.03 (-0.01) percentage points, both using a poverty line of $4 PPP per day. IPEA 
does not report figures for the poverty gap and squared poverty gap.
§ See IPEA (2009) for the 25 regional poverty lines calculated by IPEA for the years 1976-
2009. For purposes of international comparison, poverty lines in local currency can be converted 
into “international dollars” using purchasing power parity (PPP) conversion factors, which are 
intended to ensure a common purchasing power over commodities across countries (Ravallion, 
Chen, and Sangraula, 2009). Using a PPP conversion factor of $1 PPP = 1.71 reais in 2009 
prices (World Development Indicators, 2011), the non-weighted average of IPEA’s regional 
poverty lines in the year 2009 is $3.67 PPP per day. !e weighted average (weighting each spatial 
region’s poverty line by the region’s population according to the 2009 PNAD) is $3.75 PPP 
per day. !ese averages are close to the $4 PPP per day poverty line, which is commonly used 
for middle-income countries and close to the median of the moderate poverty lines officially 
set by Latin American governments (Centro de Estudios Distributivos, Laborales y Sociales 
[CEDLAS] and World Bank, 2010).
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erty, such as economic growth (Barros et al., 2010), expanded ac-
cess to education during the 1990s (Gasparini and Lustig, 2011), 
increased demand for unskilled labor,4 and an increase in the mini-
mum wage,5 cash transfer programs—and, in particular, Brazil’s 
signature anti-poverty program Bolsa Família—have also played 
an important role. 
Bolsa Família is a conditional cash transfer (CCT) program.* 
CCTs are direct monetary transfers that target poor households 
and require a specified level of investment in the human capital 
of the household’s children. !e requirements, which are known 
as conditions, usually entail a minimum level of use of health and 
education services. !ese conditions seek to reduce poverty in a 
sustainable way by giving poor children the human capital nec-
essary to break the intergenerational poverty cycle. In the case of 
Brazil, the conditions specify attendance of prenatal and postna-
tal care sessions by pregnant women and breast-feeding mothers, 
adherence to a calendar of vaccinations for children up to age five, 
and a minimum level of school attendance for children ages six to 
seventeen6
To measure the impact of Bolsa Família on poverty, it is nec-
essary to determine how poverty should be defined; in other words, 
what will be the cut-off criteria that separate the poor from the 
non-poor? Given the income-based nature of the PNAD house-
hold survey (see Section 3) and the monetary nature of CCTs, it 
makes sense to use income poverty lines. !is necessarily ignores 
the multidimensionality of poverty;† while the information avail-
able in PNAD does permit a more multidimensional evaluation of 
poverty,‡ the impact of Bolsa Família on multidimensional poverty 
cannot be accurately measured without panel data, as the program’s 
impact on factors such as education and health in a particular ben-
eficiary household are unknown.
* In English, Bolsa Família translates as Family Scholarship.
† See, for example, World Bank (2001).
‡ Using, for example, the class of multidimensional poverty measures developed by Alkire 
and Foster (2009). It should be noted that although multidimensional poverty measures have 
gained popularity in the literature, there are issues that have not been resolved and are still being 
debated. See, for example, Ravallion (2011).
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!is study will focus on the impact of Bolsa Família on abso-
lute rather than relative poverty. Alternatively, one could choose a 
relative poverty line equal to the per capita income of the individual 
or household corresponding to the yth percentile of the cumulative 
income distribution,7 or measure the program’s impact on the av-
erage income of the poorest y percent of the population.8 !e first 
alternative is necessarily arbitrary and does not correlate poverty 
with a lack of command over basic consumption needs9 or a lack 
of certain capabilities.10  !e second alternative is useful for com-
paring the average impact (on the relatively poor) of two different 
programs with equal funding,11 but it limits the analysis to aver-
ages and rules out measuring the impact on more poverty averse 
indices. For these reasons, this paper does not determine poverty 
relative to the overall income distribution, and instead regards as 
“poor” individuals who do not have enough household income per 
capita to purchase a specified vector of basic needs.
!e poverty line, in turn, will reflect the cost of that vector of 
basic needs. Calculating the cost of basic needs nationally would 
ignore regional differences in the costs of food and housing, which 
are especially important in countries that are larger and more di-
verse,12 such as Brazil. !us, the World Bank13 uses expenditure 
data from the Pesquisa de Orçamentos Familiares (POF) to cal-
culate the cost of a bundle of basic food items sufficient to fulfill 
a minimum daily caloric intake in twenty-one different regions. 
Since similar price data is not available for expenditures on non-
food basic needs, housing rental rates are used as a proxy for the 
price of non-food basic needs. Housing rental rates are estimated 
for each region using a regression model of (log) rent against dwell-
ing characteristics (such as number of rooms, electricity, type of 
floor, etc.). Table 1 shows the values of the resulting Laspeyres spa-
tial price index (which is a weighted average of the indices for food 
and housing) in twenty-one spatial regions, using metropolitan 
São Paulo as the reference region.
Deflating income by a Laspeyres price index is analogous to 
taking a welfare ratio approach to welfare measurement, which is 
preferable to the money-metric utility approach when assessing 
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policies in which distribution is an issue (in other words, when one 
wants to assume that transfers of money to the poor are more valu-
able than transfers to the non-poor, and that the poorer someone 
is, the more valuable the transfer).14 Once income has been de-
flated by a spatial price index, everyone’s income can be compared 
to a single poverty line. First deflating incomes by a spatial price 
index that accounts for regional differences in the cost of living and 
then comparing each household’s adjusted income to a fixed nomi-
nal poverty line is mathematically equivalent to comparing each 
household’s nominal income to a regional poverty line adjusted by 
the spatial price index. Since metropolitan São Paulo was chosen 
as the reference region for the price index, an appropriate poverty 
line—given the definition of poverty used in this paper—would 
be the cost of a basic needs basket in metropolitan São Paulo. "e 
World Bank (2007: Table 12) calculates this as 115 reais* in Janu-
ary 2003 prices. Adjusted for inflation of basic needs prices in São 
Paulo municipality,† this is equal to 162 reais in September 2009 
prices.
THE DATA: ISSUES AND LIMITATIONS
"e analyses in this paper use micro-data from the 2009 Pes-
quisa Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios (PNAD), an annual 
household sample survey conducted by the Brazilian government’s 
Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE). PNAD’s sample 
size in 2009 was 399,387 individuals—the survey was carried out 
in the last week of September and asked questions about the previ-
ous month. "e survey questions are based on income rather than 
consumption, even though consumption is smoother over time, can 
be more accurately measured, and better reflects a household’s abil-
* "e Brazilian currency unit is called the real. "e plural of real is reais. "e nominal exchange 
rate as of April 30, 2011 was 1 US dollar = 1.57 reais. "e purchasing power parity (PPP) 
adjusted exchange rate, based on the 2005 International Comparison Program (see World Bank, 
2008), is $1 PPP = 1.71 reais in 2009 prices (World Development Indicators, 2011).
† Conveniently, in addition to the temporal price index calculated for overall prices in the country, 
a temporal price index published by IPEA measures the monthly inflation in the cost of a basic 
needs basket in São Paulo municipality. "is index is available online at http://www.ipeadata.
gov.br
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ity to meet basic needs.15 However, one of the justifications for 
measuring income is that it requires fewer questions; in fact, the 
costs of collecting consumption data are about five times higher 
than the costs of collecting income data.16 !us, collecting income 
data allows for a larger sample size, which increases the confidence 
interval of calculations made using the micro-data and makes it 
more plausible to carry out a survey that is representative at the 
state level.
!ere are a number of methodological issues which arise 
when using household survey micro-data to estimate poverty. A 
few of the most pervasive are income underreporting, adult equiv-
alence scales, economies of scale within households, item nonre-
sponse, and defining income. Following the best practices for pov-
erty measurement outlined by Székely et al. (2004), no adjustment 
is made for income underreporting, and adult equivalence scales 
and economies of scale within households are not considered (i.e., 
household per capita income is used).
With respect to item non-response, Székely et al. (2004) rec-
ommend dropping individual observations with missing or zero in-
comes, with the justification that they introduce noise into poverty 
measurement. However, they concede that dropping these observa-
tions has no theoretical base. Another methodology is to impute 
earnings to non-respondents using matching techniques.* Alter-
natively, income can be directly imputed from Mincer coefficients, 
which can be computed a number of ways. However, the matching 
and Mincer techniques are both inadequate, as the personal and 
household characteristics used as independent variables in the re-
gressions do not closely predict income; the R-squared values of the 
regressions are usually low.17 For these reasons, this study regards 
missing and zero incomes as zero, unless the primary source of la-
bor income for the household head is missing, in which case the 
* For example, one of the options tested by Székely and Hilgert (2007) is to impute missing 
income for a given source by running a regression, with the income source as the dependent 
variable and personal and household characteristics as the independent variables. !ey then use 
the regression coefficients to predict the income from that source of each individual (respondents 
and non-respondents), and rank them according to predicted income. !e non-respondent’s 
missing income is imputed by the average of the individuals directly above and below him or 
her in the ranking.
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household is excluded from the data. !is methodology coincides 
with CEDLAS and World Bank (2010). It is worth noting that the 
different methodologies to adjust for missing and zero incomes do 
not have a large impact on poverty measures in the case of Brazil; 
Székely et al. (2004) apply a sensitivity analysis to PNAD data and 
find that the minimum and maximum values for the headcount in-
dex using different methodologies to adjust for non-response only 
vary by 2.6 percentage points.
With respect to the definition of income, Haughton and 
Khandker (2009) argue that it is important to include components 
of income that are not typically captured directly by household sur-
veys, such as in-kind income, food produced for own consumption, 
and implicit income from owner-occupied housing. In the case of 
Brazil, some in-kind income is captured by PNAD; for each la-
bor income source, the respondent is asked how much they were 
remunerated both in money and in the value of products or com-
modities.18 Respondents are also instructed to include the value 
of food produced for own consumption, but only if the individual 
did not have a separate primary job with remuneration.19 !us, 
food produced for own consumption is included but understated 
in PNAD. Implicit income for owner-occupied housing is imputed 
to households who own their homes to account for the benefit they 
receive from that housing (which they would otherwise be paying 
in rent), using the methodology proposed by Barros, Cury, and 
Ulyssea (2007). Other in-kind income, such as the value of access 
to public services, should ideally be included in household aggre-
gate income20 but the questions that would be necessary to impute 
it are not included in the survey.
!e largest limitation of the data, at least for the purposes of 
this study, is that the survey does not include a question that specif-
ically asks how much a household received in Bolsa Família trans-
fers. Instead, non-labor income is divided into eight categories, one 
of which covers “other income”, which is supposed to include finan-
cial income (e.g., interest and dividends) and income from official 
social assistance programs, including Bolsa Família.21 !us, of the 
methods to measure the direct impact of government transfers on 
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poverty and inequality (see Lustig, 2011), the inference method 
must be used. In other words, for households that reported an in-
come value in the “other income” category, it is necessary to infer 
whether that amount corresponds to a Bolsa Família payment.
To infer whether a household received Bolsa Família, the in-
come they reported under the “other income” category of non-labor 
income is compared to the possible transfer sizes of Bolsa Família, 
which are as follows (for September 2009). Any family with per 
capita income under 140 reais per month and at least one child 
under age eighteen is eligible for the program. !e program rules 
establish that households below the cut-off receive twenty-two 
reais per month for each child in the family between the ages of 
zero and fifteen (for up to three children) and thirty-three reais per 
month for each adolescent aged sixteen or seventeen (for up to two 
adolescents), provided they comply with the program’s conditions. 
Households with per capita income under seventy reais per month 
are to receive an additional sixty-eight reais per month.22 In the 
latter case, a household does not need to have children to be eli-
gible for the program; thus, the program has an unconditional cash 
transfer component for those identified as extremely poor. Table 2 
summarizes the possible sizes of a Bolsa Família transfer.
Using these values, at least two methodologies have been 
used to infer whether a family received Bolsa Família. Let Ω rep-
resent the value reported for “other income.” Allowing for round-
ing or not remembering the exact value received when reporting, 
Souza (2010) assumes that any family in which a member reports 
Ω (0, 200], with 200 being the maximum value of a Bolsa Famí-
lia transfer, received that “other income” from Bolsa Família. Since 
Ω can also come from financial income, it makes the assumption 
that no households received monthly financial income under 200 
reais, which does not seem reasonable. However, if one is con-
cerned strictly with the impact on poverty, falsely identifying a 
non-poor household’s financial income as a Bolsa Família trans-
fer is inconsequential;* that particular household will be above 
the poverty line in all cases, so it will not affect the poverty rate 
* The same is not true if  one is concerned with the impact on inequality.
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when comparing income before program transfers to income af-
ter program transfers. !us, in terms of a poverty impact analysis, 
the Souza (2010) methodology is equivalent to only assuming that 
poor families* do not receive financial income.
An alternative methodology is used by Barros, Carvalho, and 
Franco (2007). Because they analyze PNAD data from 2005 and 
earlier, they also account for the CCTs that preceded Bolsa Famí-
lia, which were phased out only gradually after 2004. Qualifying 
households could receive benefits from multiple transfer programs, 
so the authors first compute all possible combinations of program 
transfer values, and count a family as receiving “Bolsa Família and 
its predecessors” if Ω is equal to an exact value of one of the pos-
sible combinations. By 2009 however, Bolsa Família had almost 
completely replaced its predecessors,† so it is not necessary to in-
clude all the possible combinations of CCT programs. An updated 
version of the methodology would be to count a household as a 
Bolsa Família recipient if Ω is equal to the exact value of a Bolsa 
Família transfer (see Table 1). !is methodology risks excluding 
families that did not remember the exact value of their Bolsa Famí-
lia transfer, did remember the exact value but rounded (to the near-
est multiple of five or ten, for example), or received Bolsa Família 
in combination with a state- or municipal-level social assistance 
program. One example is Renda Cidadã in São Paulo state, a CCT 
of eighty reais per month to poor households,23 which until March 
2010 could be granted in addition to Bolsa Família.24
Because the two methodologies have different limitations, 
the analyses in this study are carried out using both. When the 
results are presented from one methodology and not the other, I 
will specify which methodology is presented and whether the oth-
er methodology’s results differ. Both methodologies will provide 
downward-biased results regarding the magnitude of Bolsa Famí-
lia’s impact on poverty because they do not capture all of the house-
* According to whatever poverty line is used in the analysis.
†,QPLOOLRQKRXVHKROGVZHUH%ROVD)DPtOLDEHQHÀFLDULHVQRWFRXQWLQJEHQHÀFLDULHV
ZKRVHEHQHÀWVKDGEHHQEORFNHGRUVXVSHQGHGDQGPLOOLRQZHUHEHQHÀFLDULHVRI RWKHU
&&7V %\  PLOOLRQ KRXVHKROGVZHUH %ROVD )DPtOLD EHQHÀFLDULHV DQG D QHJOLJLEOH
KRXVHKROGVZHUHEHQHÀFLDULHVRI RWKHU&&7V6RDUHVDQG6iW\UR7DEOH
98 ,MKKMRW-QTEGXSJ&SPWE*EQMPuE
holds that received transfers from the program.* According to the 
Brazilian government’s records, twelve million households received 
Bolsa Família transfers in September 2009. Using the appropri-
ate sample weights, only 5.2 million households reported Ω equal 
to an exact value of a Bolsa Família transfer on the 2009 PNAD, 
while 9.8 million reported Ω greater than zero and less than or 
equal to 200. Even when questionnaire respondents are specifically 
asked if they received Bolsa Família, which happened in 2006 as 
part of a supplemental questionnaire to the PNAD, the number 
of recipients was underestimated: only 8.1 million households re-
ceived Bolsa Família in September 2006 according to the PNAD 
supplement,25 while the number was eleven million according to 
government records.26 Table 3 summarizes the systematic under-
estimation of the number of Bolsa Família beneficiaries in PNAD.
"ere are a number of observations that can be made from 
Table 3. First, for 2006, the Souza method falsely identifies around 
1.3 million households as Bolsa Família beneficiares, compared to 
the number of families that reported receiving Bolsa Família or its 
predecessors on the special supplement. If some of those 1.3 mil-
lion households were poor and were in fact reporting financial in-
come, the Souza method might falsely attribute families escaping 
poverty due to financial income to families escaping poverty due 
to Bolsa Família. However, because it is unlikely that poor fami-
lies receive financial income27, the false inclusion of these house-
holds should not affect the analysis of Bolsa Família’s impact on 
poverty. Furthermore, even if some poor households with financial 
income were falsely included, the Souza method would most likely 
still underestimate the impact of Bolsa Família on poverty in 2009 
because at least 19 percent of Bolsa Família recipients are still not 
accounted for in the 2009 PNAD. "e BCF method has the ad-
vantage of minimizing the amount of falsely included households,† 
*(YHQWKRXJKWKH6RX]DPHWKRGZLOOIDOVHO\LGHQWLI\ÀQDQFLDOLQFRPHOHVVWKDQRUHTXDOWR
reais as Bolsa Família, it should still underestimate Bolsa Família’s impact on poverty, for the 
reasons outlined in the next paragraph.
† Foguel and Barros (2010) test the robustness of  the BCF method using the 2004 PNAD, 
ZKLFK OLNH WKH  31$' LQFOXGHG D VXSSOHPHQWDO TXHVWLRQ VSHFLÀFDOO\ DVNLQJ LI  WKH
respondent received transfers from Bolsa Família or another CCT. Less than 3 percent of  
WKRVHLGHQWLÀHGDVEHQHÀFLDULHVE\WKH%&)PHWKRGZHUHIDOVHO\LGHQWLÀHGLHWKH\LQGLFDWHG
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but the disadvantage that it grossly underestimates the amount of 
households receiving Bolsa Família; only 44 percent of September 
Bolsa Família recipients are accounted for in the 2009 PNAD us-
ing the BCF method.
!e inference error, or the difference between the number of 
beneficiaries according to government records and the number of 
beneficiaries according to PNAD, has a number of possible causes. 
First, administrative records may overstate the number of benefi-
ciaries. !is is unlikely, however, because the program’s transpar-
ency efforts include a published list of all beneficiaries. Second, the 
nature of PNAD’s sampling method and the mathematical model 
used to project absolute population numbers from the sample can 
lead to errors in its population projections.28 !e mathematical 
model is based on population results from the most recent census 
(including how the population is distributed among municipalities 
and tracts); this is particularly problematic for the 2009 PNAD, 
since the preceding census was carried out nine years prior, in 2000. 
If the spatial distribution of the population has changed signifi-
cantly since the 2000 census, the weights assigned to each house-
hold will be biased, which could cause the extrapolated estimate of 
the number of Bolsa Família beneficiaries to be biased as well.
Another potential problem with the extrapolation model is 
that the point estimate may be subject to a high variation depend-
ing on which households are selected. Bootstrapping the popula-
tion projections can reveal whether they are subject to such a bias. 
Table 4, which shows the result of bootstraps with 1000 replica-
tions, reveals that the potential for variation in the point estimates 
of beneficiary households is small. !e biases, expressed as a pro-
portion of the point estimates, are nearly zero, and the standard er-
rors are less than 1 percent of the point estimates. !us, variability 
of the population estimates does not appear to be a significant fac-
tor explaining the underestimation of Bolsa Família beneficiaries.
While the official definition of “other income” includes income 
from social assistance programs,29 interviewers do not tell survey 
respondents the definition unless asked. !us, respondents may 
on the supplemental questionnaire that they did not receive a CCT transfer).
100 ,MKKMRW-QTEGXSJ&SPWE*EQMPuE
not think to include their income from social assistance programs 
under “other income.” !is problem became obvious in 2004: as in 
2006, the 2004 PNAD included a supplement that asked specific 
questions about social assistance programs. A number of house-
holds reported “other income” of zero, only to later report receiving 
Bolsa Família or one of its predecessor CCTs on the supplemental 
questionnaire. !e problem was so prevalent that IBGE sent inter-
viewers back to those households to correct the values reported for 
“other income.”30*
Despite the above limitations, the data can still be very useful 
for assessing Bolsa Família’s impact on poverty (keeping in mind 
that the estimates will be downward biased) and comparing its im-
pact on the urban and rural poor. If program beneficiaries who are 
not captured by PNAD are distributed equivalently to those who 
are captured by PNAD in terms of income and geographical loca-
tion, there will be no effect on the conclusions of whether Bolsa 
Família has a rural bias. However, because Bolsa Família recipients 
might be more highly concentrated in municipalities that have a 
low chance of being selected by PNAD’s sampling method, such an 
assumption probably does not hold. Nevertheless, municipalities 
with a low chance of being sampled are far more highly concen-
trated in more rural areas, so Bolsa Família’s impact in rural areas 
will most likely have a stronger downward bias than Bolsa Família’s 
impact in urban areas. !us, the statistically significant rural bias 
found in this study probably underestimates Bolsa Família’s actual 
rural bias.
BOLSA FAMÍLIA’S IMPACT ON POVERTY: HIGHER IN 
RELATIVELY RURAL STATES?
!e common methodology to evaluate the direct impact of a 
transfer program on income is an ex post counterfactual incidence 
analysis. Once program beneficiaries have been identified, two sce-
narios are examined: the actual scenario, under which each indi-
* The supplemental questionnaire did not ask how much a family received from the CCT 
SURJUDPVRQO\ZKHWKHULWKDGUHFHLYHGEHQHÀWV6RDUHVHWDO
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vidual’s income is calculated using the methodology described in 
Section 3, and a counterfactual scenario. In the latter scenario, it is 
assumed the program did not exist, so the value of each Bolsa Famí-
lia transfer is subtracted from its beneficiary’s aggregate household 
income. Various measures of poverty (e.g., the headcount, poverty 
gap, and squared poverty gap indices) can then be compared under 
the two scenarios. !e percent reduction of a given poverty mea-
sure between the counterfactual and actual scenarios is interpreted 
as the impact of Bolsa Família on poverty. 
!e counterfactual methodology is limited to measuring the 
impact of Bolsa Família on poverty through one channel—its di-
rect effect on household income—and assumes away behavioral 
responses and general equilibrium effects,31 which have the poten-
tial to reduce or amplify Bolsa Família’s impact on poverty. For ex-
ample, it assumes that households do not adjust their labor supply 
in response to the transfer. Adults may increase their labor supply 
because they use the transfer income to overcome constraints aris-
ing from non-divisible costs and capital market imperfections, or 
decrease it if the transfer has negative incentive effects on labor. 
Children may decrease their labor supply to attend school, which 
might in turn cause adults to increase their labor supply, or decrease 
it if they need to take time away from work to transport their chil-
dren to and from school. In addition to time that parents may have 
to take off of work, families might face other participation costs to 
receive the transfer or comply with conditions, which would reduce 
the real value of the transfer. On the other hand, a counterfactual 
analysis also ignores the positive longer-term impact of increased 
human capital on income. It also assumes the program has no spill-
over effects, which can decrease poverty among non-beneficiaries. 
Each of these possible behavioral responses and general equilib-
rium effects is addressed in turn.
One of the criticisms of conditional cash transfers is that 
they could provide adults in beneficiary families with an incen-
tive to work less.32 !is could result from an income effect, where 
beneficiaries who were only transiently poor decrease their labor 
supply to remain eligible for the program, and/or a substitution ef-
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fect, where beneficiaries substitute time between work and leisure. 
However, CCT beneficiaries are generally very poor and more than 
likely have a low income elasticity of leisure.33 On the other hand, 
cash transfers also have the potential to increase adult labor sup-
ply. Searching for a job and investing in one’s own business have 
non-divisible costs, and the additional income from Bolsa Família 
would allow some beneficiaries to overcome these constraints and 
thereby increase their labor supply.34
From an empirical standpoint, CCTs have not had a signifi-
cant impact on adult labor supply.* Foguel and Barros (2010) find 
that Bolsa Família had no effect on female labor participation rates, 
a statistically significant but very small negative impact on female 
hours worked, a statistically significant but very small positive 
impact on male participation rates, and no effect on male hours 
worked. Similarly, Teixeira (2008: Table 2) finds no effect on male 
labor supply and a small negative effect on female labor supply av-
eraging 2.6 hours per week. Tavares (2010) finds that mother ben-
eficiaries tend to reduce the length of their work week by between 
0.8 and 1.7 hours. Soares and Sátyro (2009) note that the observed 
effect of Bolsa Família on female labor supply is insubstantial, and 
is actually a desirable impact of the program, since some of the re-
duced work hours are probably spent caring for young children, 
and a vast literature has documented the important benefits of 
early childhood development.
When families face costs to receive their transfer or com-
ply with conditions, the real value of  the transfer decreases. For 
this reason, Lustig (2011) stresses the importance of  subtracting 
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ries use an electronic card at ATM machines. There are minimal 
or no direct costs to complying with the health and education 
conditions, as public education and health facilities are free to all 
%UD]LOLDQV+RSHIXOO\WKHVHIDFWRUVKDYHPLQLPL]HGWKHSURJUDP·V
direct and participation costs, although those costs might remain 
higher for rural households who live further from schools and 
health centers.
While decreased mother and child labor supply and participa-
tion costs could lower the amount by which Bolsa Família increases 
family income, other factors may increase Bolsa Família’s impact 
on poverty in ways that are not captured by a counterfactual simu-
lation. !e first is through the program conditions, which should 
(ideally) increase human capital accumulation among poor children 
and decrease poverty in the long term. !e second is through in-
direct and spillover effects. For example, the magnetic benefit card 
given to Bolsa Família beneficiaries (who are preferentially women) 
can also be used for other basic banking functions—including ac-
cess to credit and insurance services—which is an important step 
toward the financial inclusion of poor women.36 In addition, CCTs 
have been shown to decrease poverty among poor non-beneficiaries 
living in the same community as beneficiaries.37 38
Assuming away these and any additional behavioral responses 
and general equilibrium effects, Bolsa Família caused between a 12 
and 18 percent decrease in the poverty headcount index, between 
a 19 and 26 percent decrease in the poverty gap, and between a 24 
and 31 percent decrease in the squared poverty gap at the national 
level in 2009.* !e decrease was substantially lower in Brazil’s most 
urban states (measured by proportion of the population living in 
metropolitan areas)† and substantially higher in Brazil’s most rural 
* The ranges presented here do not account for standard error (see Table 5), but for the two 
PHWKRGRORJLHVXVHGWRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUDIDPLO\UHFHLYHG%ROVD)DPtOLDVHH6HFWLRQ
†'HVSLWHKDYLQJWKHKLJKHVWPHWURSROLWDQSURSRUWLRQDFFRUGLQJWRWKH31$'DQGWKH
second-highest urban proportion according to the preliminary results of  the 2010 census 
(IBGE, 2011), Distrito Federal was excluded from selection as the most urban state because 
RI WKHIROORZLQJLUUHJXODULW\DFFRUGLQJWRWKH%&)PHWKRGRQO\KRXVHKROGVUHFHLYHG




states (measured by proportion of the population living in rural 
areas).* For example, the impact on the headcount index in Rio de 
Janeiro state (the most urban), was only between 4 and 7 percent, 
while in Piauí (the most rural), it was between 31 and 37 percent. 
Table 5 presents these results.
After adjusting income for spatial price differentials to gener-
ate poverty measures that obey the consistency principle and re-
flect the real living standards of the poor in different regions, Bolsa 
Família has had a much higher impact on poverty in Brazil’s most 
rural state, Piauí, than its most urban state, Rio de Janeiro. For all 
measures of poverty in Table 5, the true reduction in poverty in 
Piauí was higher than in Rio de Janeiro at the 1 percent significance 
level. "e robustness of this result was also tested using sensitiv-
ity analyses, and is robust to the choice of different states,† alter-
native spatial price indices,‡ and different poverty lines. "e null 
hypothesis could always be rejected at the 10 percent significance 
level, meaning that the general conclusion that one can be at least 
90 percent confident that Bolsa Família has had a higher impact 
on poverty in Brazil’s most rural states than its most urban states 
is very robust.
Having confirmed that Bolsa Família is significantly biased 
toward Brazil’s most rural states compared to its most urban states, 
in terms of its real impact on living standards, it is useful to test 
for a rural bias across all states. A rural bias can be confirmed if, 
when taking all of Brazil’s states into account, there is a strong 
* The proportions of  the population living in metropolitan and rural areas in each state were 
H[WUDSRODWHG IURP WKH 31$' XVLQJ DSSURSULDWH VDPSOLQJZHLJKWV$FFRUGLQJ WR WKH
preliminary results of  the 2010 census, published by IGBE (2011), Rio de Janeiro is indeed 
the most urban state, while Piauí is the second-most rural state behind Maranhão (which is, in 
turn, the third-most rural according to the PNAD). As part of  the robustness test discussed 
later in this section, hypothesis tests were performed using Piauí, Maranhão, and Alagoas as 
WKHPRVWUXUDOVWDWHVDQG5LRGH-DQHLURDQG6mR3DXORDVWKHPRVWXUEDQVWDWHV
†  "e states tested as most rural were Piauí, Alagoas, and Maranhão. "e states tested as most 
urban were Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo. Distrito Federal was not considered due to a data 
irregularity discussed in an earlier footnote, and the fourth-most urban state was not tested in its 
place due to large discrepancies between which state is most urban according to the two possible 
measures: highest proportion living in metropolitan areas and highest proportion living in urban 
[i.e., non-rural] areas.
‡  Specifically, a price index using the cost of a basic needs basket calculated by IPEA for 25 
different spatial regions based on expenditure data from the 1987/1988 POF survey (see IPEA, 
2009).
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positive correlation between a state’s percentage population living 
in rural areas and the impact of Bolsa Família on poverty in that 
state. Indeed, such a correlation exists, as shown in Figure 3, which 
compares Bolsa Família’s state-level impact on the squared poverty 
gap with the estimated percentage of a state’s population that lives 
in rural areas.* Each state is one observation, or one point on the 
scatterplot. !e positive correlation is statistically significant (the 
t-statistic equals 6.76) and the data conforms fairly well to the cor-
relation (R-squared = 0.65). !e more rural a state is, the more 
successful Brazil’s signature anti-poverty program tends to be.
PROBABILITY OF ESCAPING POVERTY DUE TO BOLSA 
FAMÍLIA
Another way to test and quantify Bolsa Família’s rural bias is 
to compare the probability of being urban and poor to being rural 
and poor in the actual and counterfactual scenarios, using a probit 
model. Probit regression analyses are frequently used in poverty as-
sessments to determine the correlates of poverty.39 Comparing the 
results of probit models in actual and counterfactual scenarios can 
be used to see how transfer programs change the composition of 
who is poor, and which sub-groups of the poor are more likely to 
remain poor despite the program.40
!e socioeconomic variables selected for the probit model are 
similar to those used by Pessino (2011) to compare the probabili-
ties of being poor before government transfers and remaining poor 
after government transfers in Argentina. Her independent variables 
include the number of children in the family, dummy variables for 
geographic region and whether the house is in a shantytown or 
other precarious location, and dummy variables for the gender, age, 
*  !e squared poverty gap is chosen because it satisfies a number of desirable poverty axioms 
that are not satisfied by the headcount index or poverty gap, such as the monotonicity axiom 
(satisfied by the poverty gap but not the headcount index) and the transfer axiom (not satisfied 
by the headcount index or poverty gap) (Foster, Greer, and !orbecke, 1984). It is less useful 
to focus on Bolsa Família’s impact on the incidence of poverty, as the most cost-effective way to 
lower the headcount index is to target those whose incomes per capita place them right below 
the poverty line, whereas those who are furthest from the poverty line are arguably much more 
needy.
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education level, and migration, employment, and marital status of 
the household head. !is study added a dummy variable to dis-
tinguish between urban and rural households.* !e shantytown 
variable was removed due to data limitations, and migration status 
was removed due to the existence of small cells when performing 
crosstab tests. To maintain the categorical nature of the predictor 
variables, the number of children variable was changed to a dummy 
variable equal to one if there are children in the household, and 
zero if there are not.† As in Pessino (2011), one probit model is run 
to estimate the probability of being poor before monetary transfers 
(in this case, Bolsa Família), and another to estimate the probabil-
ity of being poor after transfers, conditional on being poor before 
transfers. !e latter is equivalent to the probability of remaining 
poor after Bolsa Família, and can also be used to calculate the prob-
ability of escaping poverty due to Bolsa Família. Table 6 presents 
the results of the two probit regressions.
In the first probit, a negative coefficient indicates a lower prob-
ability than the omitted group of being poor before Bolsa Famí-
lia, and a positive coefficient indicates a higher probability than 
the omitted group. !e results are as expected: households with 
children have a higher chance of living in poverty than households 
without, households in the Northeast and North regions are more 
likely to be poor than households in other regions, and households 
with an educated household head employed in the formal sector 
are least likely to poor. Living in a rural setting makes a household 
substantially more likely to be poor than living in an urban area. 
As an illustration, consider a family with children in the North 
region, headed by a single female between the ages of twenty-five 
and forty who completed primary school but not secondary school 
and is employed in the informal sector. In an urban area, such a 
household would have a 14 percent likelihood of being poor, while 
a household with the same characteristics would have a 21 percent 
*  Such a variable could not be included in Pessino’s analysis for Argentina, since Argentina’s 
household survey only covers urban areas.
†  !e model was estimated with and without this change, with an insubstantial change in the 
coefficients and no change in the conclusions.
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likelihood of being poor in an urban area.*
In the second probit, a negative coefficient indicates a high-
er probability than the omitted group of escaping poverty due to 
Bolsa Família, while a positive coefficient indicates a higher prob-
ability of remaining poor despite the existence of the anti-poverty 
program. A family could remain poor despite the program because 
it does not receive a transfer from Bolsa Família, or because the 
transfer is insufficient. In the former case, the poor family might be 
excluded from the program by design (because there are no chil-
dren in the household, for example), by choice (self-exclusion), or 
by error (perhaps the family has not been identified as poor by the 
municipal workers responsible for registering poor families for the 
program). In the latter case, the family’s monthly income remains 
too low to purchase a basic needs basket in the area, despite receiv-
ing a Bolsa Família transfer.
As Table 6 shows, rural households are more likely to escape 
from poverty due to Bolsa Família, and urban households are more 
likely to remain poor in spite of the anti-poverty program.† "e 
hypothetical household presented above would have a 31 percent 
chance of escaping poverty in rural Brazil, and a 26 percent chance 
in urban Brazil.‡ "is makes sense: the cost of living tends to be 
significantly higher in urban areas (see Table 1), and Bolsa Famí-
lia’s eligibility cut-off for household income per capita is not ad-
justed for regional differences in the cost of living, so urban (and, in 
particular, metropolitan) families living in poverty should be more 
likely to be excluded from the anti-poverty program by design.§ As 
*  "is follows from P(Z < –2.049 + 0.293 + 0.248 – 0.073 – 0.324 + 0.595 + 0.217) = .14, 
and P(Z < –2.049 + 0.293 + 0.248 – 0.073 – 0.324 + 0.595 + 0.217 + 0.297) = .21.
†  "is does not mean that rural families are less likely than urban families to be poor after 
Bolsa Família. On the contrary, the results of a probit regression to measure the probability of 
being poor after Bolsa Família (not conditional on being poor beforehand) reveal that the rural 
predictor variable has a coefficient of 0.240. Even though rural families have a higher likelihood 
of escaping poverty due to Bolsa Família, they are still substantially more likely to be poor than 
urban families.
‡  "is follows from 1 – P(Z < 1.922 – 0.413 – 0.400 – 0.335 – 0.119 – 0.018 + 0.006 – 
0.146) = .31, and 1 – P(Z < 1.922 – 0.413 – 0.400 – 0.335 – 0.119 – 0.018 + 0.006) = .26.
§  For a description of the difference between exclusion by design and true errors of exclusion, 
see Lustig (2011); for a practical application of the concepts to case studies of Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, and Peru, see Lustig et al. (2011).
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an example, a family living in Brasília with household per capita 
income of 150 reais per month would be ineligible for Bolsa Famí-
lia (the cut-off is 140 reais41), despite not being able to afford a 
minimum standard of living (the basic needs basket costs about 
167 reais in Brasília).* On the other hand, a family with household 
per capita income of 110 reais per month living anywhere in rural 
Brazil would be eligible for Bolsa Família, despite already being ca-
pable of purchasing the basic needs basket.†
To move beyond hypothetical examples, the survey data 
matches up quite well with the assertion that poor metropolitan 
families would be more likely to be excluded from the anti-poverty 
program by design. Over one hundred thousand poor households 
with children had nominal income above the Bolsa Família eligibil-
ity cut-off in 2009 and did not receive Bolsa Família; they were ex-
cluded by design. "e sample mean of the values of the Laspeyres 
spatial price index corresponding to each of those excluded house-
holds equals 0.988 (nearly the index’s maximum), and running a 
tabulation of the spatial regions to which each of the observations 
belongs reveals that all of the poor in the sample who were exclud-
ed by the program design feature of not adjusting program eligibil-
ity for the different costs faced by the poor across regions lived in 
four metropolises: Belém, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Brasília.‡ 
While some poor metropolitan households with children are 
declared ineligible and excluded, over a third of beneficiary families 
that are eligible based on nominal income are non-poor, meaning 
they could already afford the basic needs basket. "ese non-poor 
yet eligible households are most highly concentrated in the rural 
Northeast region, which has the lowest cost of fulfilling basic needs.
Even after accounting for the likelihood of being excluded 
by design, poor urban households are still more likely than rural 
*  "e cost of the basic needs basket in Brasília is calculated as the cost of the same basket in 
metropolitan São Paulo in September, 2009 (162 reais) times 1.028, the value for Brasília of the 
Laspeyres spatial price index for food and housing, which is indexed to São Paulo (see Section 
2).
†  In Brazil’s most expensive rural area, the basic needs basket would cost 106 reais. "is follows 
from multiplying the cost of the basic needs basket in metropolitan São Paulo in September, 
2009 (162 reais) by the highest value of the Laspeyre’s price index in rural areas (0.654).
‡  186 sampled households, representing 103,394 actual households, fit these criteria.
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households to see their transfers fall short of what is needed to es-
cape poverty, since the transfer has a lower purchasing power in ar-
eas with a higher cost of living. !e average cost of living in Brazil’s 
ten metropolises is about 40 percent higher than the average cost 
of living in Brazil’s rural areas, which can have an important impact 
on the real purchasing power of the transfer in terms of the food 
and non-food basic needs it can buy. In many cases, the difference 
is even higher: the cost of a basket of basic needs in metropolitan 
Brasília, São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, or Belém is over twice as expen-
sive in nominal terms as the same basket in the rural Northeast 
(see Table 1). !us, not only would a poor family in Belém with a 
given per capita monthly income already be much worse off than a 
family with the same nominal income living in the rural Northeast 
(ceteris paribus), but the transfer would also make a much smaller 
impact on the metropolitan family’s standard of living, since it can 
only be used to purchase around half of the basic needs that could 
be purchased with the same nominal transfer in the rural North-
east. It is not surprising, then, that poor families in the Northeast 
(which is also Brazil’s most rural region) are more likely to escape 
poverty due to Bolsa Família than poor families in any other region 
(see Table 6).
In sum, Bolsa Família’s rural bias becomes even more obvi-
ous when analyzing the probability of being poor in the absence of 
Bolsa Família income, the sub-groups with the highest likelihood 
of escaping poverty after Bolsa Família, and the effects that spatial 
price differences can have on program eligibility and the real value 
of monetary transfers. While rural households are more likely to 
be poor in the absence of Bolsa Família, they are also more likely to 
surpass the poverty line due to the CCT. Metropolitan households 
are more likely to be excluded from the program because eligibility 
is based on nominal income. Furthermore, an urban beneficiary’s 
transfer will have a lower purchasing power and a lower positive 
impact on standard of living than a nominally equal transfer to a 
rural beneficiary. Probit regressions, hypothetical examples, and an 
analysis of the composition of the non-eligible poor and the eligible 
non-poor confirmed the rural bias found in Section 4, and rein-
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forced the speculation that regional differences in the cost of living 
are the primary cause of Bolsa Família’s rural bias.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Having identified Bolsa Família’s larger impact in rural areas 
and the fact that some of Brazil’s poor children living in metro-
politan areas are excluded from the program by design, while some 
non-poor households in rural areas remain eligible and, in fact, 
do receive Bolsa Família transfers, a logical follow-up would be 
to determine what implications this has for policy. From the gov-
ernment’s and policymakers’ perspective, there are two possibili-
ties: first, that Bolsa Família was intended to have a rural bias—in 
which case no policy action would be required—and second, that 
the rural bias is an unintended consequence of not adjusting the 
CCT program’s eligibility cut-off and transfer size for spatial price 
differentials.
"ere are a number of reasons the Brazilian government 
might have intended for Bolsa Família to have a rural bias. Histori-
cally, poverty has been much higher in rural Brazil than in urban 
Brazil.42 Baseline school enrollment rates also tend to be lower in 
rural areas,43 indicating that rural families are investing less in the 
human capital of their children. In addition, since rural families 
tend to live further from schools, health facilities, and transfer pay-
ment locations, the direct and opportunity costs of complying with 
the program conditions tends to be higher in rural areas, which 
could justify a higher real transfer for rural households.* For these 
reasons, a number of CCT programs are explicitly restricted to 
the rural poor: examples include El Salvador’s Red Solidaria, Para-
guay’s Tekaporã, and, up until 2003, Mexico’s signature anti-pover-
ty program Oportunidades.44 Other CCTs have used geographic 
targeting mechanisms that advertently or inadvertently focus on 
the rural poor, such as Nicaragua’s Red de Protección Social45 and 
*  To deal with this issue, one of the bills on the table in the Brazilian legislature seeks to increase 
the transfer amount received by rural families who face high transportation costs to withdraw 
their transfers (Britto and Soares, 2011). "is type of proposal does not take into account that 
rural beneficiaries already receive higher transfers in real terms than their urban counterparts.
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Guatemala’s Mi Familia Progresa.46
In the case of Brazil, however, it does not seem that the pro-
gram’s rural bias is the result of an intentional objective to focus 
specifically on the higher persistence of poverty, low school en-
rollment, child labor, or program transaction costs in rural areas. 
!e law instituting Bolsa Família (Lei No 10.836/04) makes no 
mention of rural or urban areas, nor do the program’s objectives, 
described by Brazil’s Ministry of Social Development.47 !e fact 
that some metropolitan families who cannot afford a basic needs 
basket for each family member are deemed ineligible and excluded 
from the program, while some non-poor rural families are deemed 
eligible and included in the program (see Section 5), is in direct 
conflict with Bolsa Família’s role as a component of Brazil’s Zero 
Hunger safety net system, whose objective is to assure the human 
rights of adequate nourishment and food security.48 With this ob-
jective in mind, there is no justification for excluding families who 
cannot afford a basic needs basket.
One of the three “principal axes” of Bolsa Família is the cash 
transfer, which is intended to promote the immediate alleviation of 
poverty.49 !at being the case, a portion of the metropolitan poor 
should not be excluded by design. Not adjusting the transfer size 
for spatial price differences is also unjustified, as the transfer does 
much less to alleviate poverty for poor urban households than for 
poor rural ones.
With these considerations in mind, the Brazilian legislature 
should move to adjust the program’s eligibility cut-off and trans-
fer size to account for regional cost of living differences. An ideal 
adjustment would divide the country into multiple spatial regions, 
such as the twenty-one used in this paper (see Table 1) or the 
twenty-five used by IPEA (see IPEA, 2009), to more truly reflect 
differences in the cost of living and make the real values of the el-
igibility cut-off and transfer size as consistent as possible across 
the country. Because program eligibility is determined via partially 
verified means testing of self-reported income and registered in an 
electronic database called Cadastro Único,50 it would be straight-
forward to adjust the means test and registry to incorporate spatial 
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price differences. Furthermore, benefits are withdrawn using mag-
netic cards at ATM machines,51 so adjusting benefits based on cost 
of living should also be simple. "e only added administrative cost 
of adjusting for spatial price differences would theoretically be the 
small up-front cost of programming a code that automatically ad-
justs the eligibility cut-off and benefits.* 
Adjusting eligibility cut-offs for price differences in two or 
three spatial regions is not unheard of for cash transfer programs: 
South Africa accounts for urban/rural location in the simple means 
test used to determine eligibility for an unconditional cash trans-
fer program,52 and Panama has different cut-offs for rural indig-
enous areas, rural non-indigenous areas, and urban areas.53 Nor 
is it unheard of to adjust the transfer size, even in Brazil itself: the 
country’s first federal CCT, Programa de Erradicação do Trabalho 
Infantil,† gave twenty-five reais per child per month to rural fami-
lies with children employed in dangerous forms of child labor, and 
forty reais per child to urban ones.54 In other countries, Colombia’s 
Familias en Acción pays higher transfers to the urban poor.55
In sum, adjusting the eligibility cut-off and transfer size of 
Bolsa Família for spatial price differences would make the pro-
gram more in line with its overarching objectives, and add neither 
a great deal of complexity nor substantial administrative costs to 
the program. Such a change is bound to be controversial, however. 
Rural beneficiaries or municipalities might not trust the spatial 
price index, and feel that they are getting cheated by the adjust-
ment. Political economy dynamics might complicate an effort to 
reduce the program’s rural bias. When former president Luiz Iná-
cio Lula da Silva was reelected in October 2006, he won every state 
in the Northeast region (Brazil’s most rural region) by a consider-
able margin, whereas his main support in four previous presiden-
tial elections (of which he won one and lost three) had been in the 
more urbanized South and Southeast regions.56 Voting patterns in 
*  It helps that the same entity, Caixa Econômica Federal, is in charge of the Cadastro Único 
database, responsible for paying the benefits, and even owns the ATMs that beneficiaries use to 
receive their benefits (Soares and Sátyro, 2009).
†  In English, this translates as Child Labor Eradication Program.
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the 2010 election mirrored those of 2006: Lula’s appointed succes-
sor and former chief of staff Dilma Rousseff also won every state 
in the Northeast.57 In both cases, this regional shift of electoral 
support can be largely attributed to Bolsa Família.58,59
If the spatial price adjustment proposed in this paper had to 
be made without increasing the program’s budget, current benefi-
ciaries who are not poor would have to be removed from the pro-
gram in order to include the currently excluded poor metropolitan 
households, and the transfers allocated to rural households would 
have to be decreased in order to increase the transfers allocated to 
urban households. Removing households that are not poor is con-
sistent with the program’s objectives; indeed, if a beneficiary family 
escapes poverty during their first two years in the program, they exit 
the program at the end of that period. Nevertheless, it might not be 
ideal to remove families that are non-poor but near-poor. Income 
volatility is particularly high in Brazil,60 especially among Brazil’s 
poor.61 As a result, people at risk of becoming poor frequently 
cross the poverty line in both directions.62 Systemic shocks can 
push many near-poor households below the poverty line; economic 
recessions in Latin America have been associated with increases in 
poverty, particularly among children.63 Shocks can also have nega-
tive effects on poor children’s human capital accumulation. Brazil’s 
macroeconomic crisis of 1987–1991, for example, was associated 
with lower school enrollment and higher infant mortality.64 Be-
cause Bolsa Família seeks to alleviate poverty not only in the pres-
ent but also in the future, and because it is an important part of 
Brazil’s broader system of safety nets, families that are non-poor 
but highly vulnerable to falling into poverty should not necessarily 
be excluded. "us, even on theoretical grounds, it is controversial 
to remove the near-poor beneficiaries, such as the rural households 
who are eligible for the program due to their low nominal income, 
but can buy a basket of basic needs in their region and are therefore 
not poor.* It is even more controversial to reduce the benefits of 
*  The non-poor who are also not vulnerable to poverty, however, should be removed. There 
VKRXOGEHDEVROXWHO\QREHQHÀFLDULHV LQWKHWRSSHUFHQWRI  WKHGLVWULEXWLRQIXQFWLRQRI 
household income per capita, for example; in 2006, about 5 percent of  Bolsa Família transfers 
ZHQWWRWKLVSRUWLRQRI WKHSRSXODWLRQ6RDUHVDQG6iW\UR7KLVLVNQRZQDVDQHUURURI 
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poor rural households, who may still be in poverty despite receiving 
Bolsa Família, in order to free up budgetary resources to increase 
the transfers of poor urban households and “even out” the real ben-
efits received by each.
Nevertheless, there is no reason to believe that Bolsa Famí-
lia’s budget is limited to what it currently spends. On the contrary, 
the total program budget and the total value of transfers paid have 
increased every year since the program began. In addition, the pro-
gram has been expanding to include more households since the 11 
million household limit was removed in January 2009. Figure 4 
shows the increase in the number of beneficiary households and 
total transfers paid since the program was implemented in January 
2004. In fact, when the limit was removed at the beginning of 2009, 
the government set a new goal (but not a limit) for the number of 
beneficiaries: 13.7 million households by the end of that year.65 As 
of March 2011, Brazil was still over 750,000 households short of 
that goal,66 indicating that there is ample room to add the excluded 
metropolitan poor into the program.
How should this be accomplished? First, all metropolitan 
households with nominal per capita income above the current eli-
gibility cut-off but below the cost of a basic needs basket who are 
already registered in the Cadastro Único should immediately be 
included in the program. Municipal workers, who are in charge of 
locating the poor in their respective municipalities, should be in-
formed of the change, so they know the revised target population. 
Municipal quotas, which are based on poverty mapping elaborated 
by IBGE and identify a target number of beneficiaries in each mu-
nicipality, are used to identify municipalities that are underper-
forming in locating beneficiary households;67 these quotas should 
be revised according to the spatial price adjustment.
With regard to increasing the transfer size, scaling up benefits 
by the Laspeyres spatial price index presented in Section 2—as-
suming the government does not wish to lower the amount paid 
to rural households—would increase the cost of transfers by ap-
inclusion or unintended leakage.
115Journal of Politics & Society
proximately 42 percent.* !is is a very affordable increase, especial-
ly considering that Bolsa Família is a relatively lightweight budget 
item, at just 0.39 percent of Brazil’s GDP in 2009.† After the in-
crease, the program would cost about 0.55 percent of GDP, which 
can be compared to other more regressive government transfers 
such as federal employee pensions, which cost 2.3 percent of GDP, 
and social security, which costs 7.0 percent of GDP.68
Furthermore, Brazil’s executive branch already increases the 
nominal transfer size periodically. Since the program was imple-
mented, the transfer was increased by presidential decree in July 
2007, June 2008, July 2009, and March 2011.69 70 !e most recent 
increase raised the minimum transfer from twenty-two to thirty-
two reais—an unprecedented 45 percent increase. Bills on the 
table in Brazil’s Senate and Chamber of Deputies propose further 
increases to transfer size, such as indexing the benefit to nation-
al inflation and adding performance-based benefits. Another bill 
currently under consideration in the Senate proposes to raise the 
minimum Bolsa Família benefit to half of the monthly minimum 
wage.71 At present, the minimum wage is 510 reais, and increasing 
each household’s monthly transfer to 255 reais would increase the 
cost of transfers by a factor of ten. Clearly, Brazil’s policymakers are 
not opposed to raising the cost of Bolsa Família transfers, especially 
when the well-being of poor households and their children is at 
stake.
In short, the Brazilian legislature should adjust Bolsa Famí-
lia’s eligibility cut-off and transfer size to account for spatial price 
differences. Including poor metropolitan households that are cur-
*  The total monthly cost of  Bolsa Família transfers after the proposed adjustment is 
calculated as the sum of  the cost of  transfers after the adjustment in each state. The cost of  
transfers in state s, in turn, is calculated as the value of  transfers paid in state s in March, 2011 
times an index measuring the average cost of  living in state s. The index is calculated as the 
sample mean of  the Laspeyres spatial price values corresponding to the surveyed individuals 
IURPWKDWVWDWHGLYLGHGE\WKHORZHVWYDOXHRI WKHRULJLQDO/DVSH\UHVVSDWLDOSULFHLQGH[
(see Table 1), to ensure that all families receive no less than they were previously receiving in 
nominal terms. The proportional increase in total monthly cost is simply the national monthly 
cost after the proposed adjustment (which comes to $1.7 billion reais) divided by the national 




rently excluded by the nominal eligibility cut-off should be the first 
priority. Ideally, they should not replace non-poor beneficiaries that 
are vulnerable to poverty, since income is volatile and systemic and 
idiosyncratic shocks can send near-poor families into poverty. "e 
number of beneficiary households has been increasing since the 
limit was removed at the beginning of 2009, and the current num-
ber of beneficiaries is still over 750,000 households less than the 
goal that was set for the end of 2009. Excluded poor metropolitan 
households that are already registered in Cadastro Único should 
be included immediately, and urban municipalities should expand 
their search for poor households that were previously thought to 
be ineligible. Transfer sizes should also be increased, which can be 
done without reducing any household’s transfer for 42 percent of 
the current cost of transfers. "is is very affordable, especially con-
sidering the precedent for raising Bolsa Família’s transfer size.
CONCLUSIONS
Poverty has been falling in Brazil since 2003 according to all 
commonly-used poverty measures, and monetary transfers have 
played an important role in this process. In particular, the condi-
tional cash transfer program Bolsa Família caused between a 12 
and 18 percent decrease in the poverty headcount index, and be-
tween a 24 and 31 percent decrease in the squared poverty gap 
index in 2009. Because the eligibility cut-off and transfer size of 
the program are not adjusted for regional differences in the cost of 
living, it has had a much higher impact in rural areas than in urban 
ones.
"is paper adjusted income by a Laspeyres spatial price index 
to reflect the different costs of a basic needs basket in different areas. 
"is adjustment also generates poverty lines that obey the consis-
tency property, or in other words, that are fixed in terms of the real 
standard of living they imply. Using consistent poverty lines, Bolsa 
Família reduced the squared poverty gap by around 50 percent in 
Brazil’s most rural state, Piauí, and around 8 percent in its most 
urban state, Rio de Janeiro. Since poverty figures are calculated us-
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ing a sample survey that is subject to measurement error, however, 
it is possible for an observed difference in poverty reduction in two 
states to be statistically insignificant; a hypothesis test confirmed 
that Bolsa Família’s impact was higher in Brazil’s most rural states 
than in its most urban ones. "e robustness of this result was also 
tested, and is robust to the choice of different states, alternative 
spatial price indices, and different poverty lines. Furthermore, there 
is strong positive correlation between a state’s percentage popula-
tion living in rural areas and the impact that Bolsa Família had on 
the squared poverty gap in that state.
A probit model comparison was used to see how Bolsa Famí-
lia changed the composition of who is poor, and which sub-groups 
of the poor were more likely to remain poor despite the program. 
While rural families are more likely to be poor before Bolsa Famí-
lia, they are also more likely to escape poverty due to the program. 
Urban families are more likely to remain in poverty, either because 
they are excluded or because the transfers they receive fall short. A 
group of metropolitan poor that was excluded because its nomi-
nal incomes exceeded the eligibility cut-off was identified, as well 
as a group of non-poor rural beneficiaries whose nominal incomes 
made it eligible for the program.
For Bolsa Família to achieve its objectives, spatial price dif-
ferentials must be taken into account when setting the eligibility 
cut-off and transfer size. It is not unprecedented to adjust a CCT 
for regional differences in the cost of living; a few cash transfer pro-
grams in other countries adjust the eligibility cut-off or transfer 
size for price differences across two or three spatial regions. An 
ideal adjustment would make a narrower distinction, such as the 
adjustment proposed here, which divides Brazil into twenty-one 
spatial regions.
Given that the number of Bolsa Família beneficiaries has 
been expanding since the eleven million household limit was re-
moved in early 2009, and that the current number of beneficiary 
households is still about 750,000 households below the goal set by 
the government for the end of 2009, poor metropolitan households 
that were excluded by the nominal eligibility cut-off could very fea-
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sibly be immediately included in the program. Excluded poor met-
ropolitan households (those with nominal per capita income above 
the current eligibility cut-off but below the cost of a basic needs 
basket) that are already registered in the Cadastro Único should 
immediately be included in the program, and municipal quotas 
should be adjusted. "e size of transfers should also be adjusted 
for regional differences in the cost of living. Assuming policymak-
ers do not want to decrease the size of anyone’s transfer, the value 
of transfers to be paid would increase by 42 percent, which is very 
affordable, especially since Bolsa Família is a relatively lightweight 
budget item, comprising just 0.39 percent of GDP in 2009.
Policymakers have already shown interest in expanding both 
the coverage and benefits of Bolsa Família in order to continue al-
leviating poverty and increasing the human capital of Brazil’s poor. 
"e next step is to adjust Bolsa Família’s eligibility cut-off and 
transfers for the different prices faced by the urban and rural poor, 
and to expand the program accordingly.
To view all charts and tables, visit:
http://www.helvidius.org/2012/higgins
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